Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90101-4zbMath0519.90013OpenAlexW2038827041MaRDI QIDQ1054624

Zvi Ritz

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90101-4

zbMATH Keywords

private goodsn-person nondictatorial Arrow-type social welfare functionn-person social choicenonmanipulable social choice correspondencesets of restricted domains of preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Dominant strategy implementation in economic environments ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ An equivalence of secure implementability and full implementability in truthful strategies in pure exchange economies with Leontief utility functions ⋮ Maximal Domains for Maskin Monotone Pareto Optimal and Anonymous Choice Rules ⋮ Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives ⋮ A note on nondictatorial conditions for choice mechanisms

Cites Work

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• Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives
• Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
• Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules
• A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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