Dimensions of election procedures: Analyses and comparisons
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1055323
DOI10.1007/BF00162114zbMath0521.90007MaRDI QIDQ1055323
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
comparisonevaluationstrategyincentive compatibilityagenda formationballot formscandidate strategyelection proceduresmethods of aggregationnomination processvoter psychology
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