Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1055697
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90076-5zbMath0521.90106OpenAlexW2048363324MaRDI QIDQ1055697
Drew Fudenberg, David K. Levine
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.dklevine.com/papers/sgperfect.pdf
existenceuniquenessinfinite-horizon equilibrialimit equilibriaepsilon-equilibriuminfinite-horizon gamessubgame-perfect equilibria
Related Items (67)
Limit games and limit equilibria ⋮ Does backwards induction imply subgame perfection? ⋮ Forecast horizons for a class of dynamic games ⋮ Topological essentiality in infinite games ⋮ Subgame-perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibria in perfect information games with sigma-discrete discontinuities ⋮ Doing it now, later, or never ⋮ Equilibrium in behavior strategies in infinite extensive form games with imperfect information ⋮ Decentralized learning from failure ⋮ Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibria in games with almost perfect information ⋮ Automatic verification of concurrent stochastic systems ⋮ Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium ⋮ On refinements of subgame perfect \(\epsilon\)-equilibrium ⋮ A competitive search game with a moving target ⋮ Conditional Markov equilibria in discounted dynamic games ⋮ Optimistic stability in games of perfect information ⋮ Efficiency in repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring ⋮ Interim correlated rationalizability in infinite games ⋮ Reputation with one-sided monitoring: ignorance as a commitment device ⋮ Perfect equilibrium histories of finite and infinite horizon games ⋮ Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency ⋮ Does rational learning lead to Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated games? ⋮ General time consistent discounting ⋮ Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market ⋮ Optimal choice for finite and infinite horizons ⋮ Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games ⋮ Strategic experimentation with private payoffs ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model with deterministic procedures ⋮ Finite and infinite action dynamic games with imperfect information ⋮ Conditions for equivalence between sequentiality and subgame perfection ⋮ On the Existence of Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria ⋮ Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities. ⋮ On the existence of weak subgame perfect equilibria ⋮ Equilibria in multi-player multi-outcome infinite sequential games ⋮ Non-existence of subgame-perfect \(\varepsilon \)-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon ⋮ An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information ⋮ Asset trading mechanisms and expansionary policy ⋮ Adverse producer incentives and product quality when consumers are short- term players ⋮ ON GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION: EQUILIBRIA, ε–EQUILIBRIA AND APPROXIMATION BY SIMPLE GAMES ⋮ Characterizing existence of equilibrium for large extensive form games: a necessity result ⋮ Renegotiation in repeated games ⋮ Existence of stationary bargaining equilibria ⋮ Dynamic price competition ⋮ Bargaining in dynamic markets ⋮ Equilibrium behaviors in repeated games ⋮ On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors ⋮ Infinite horizon equilibrium with incomplete markets ⋮ Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions ⋮ Finitely Additive Dynamic Programming ⋮ Simple collective equilibria in stopping games ⋮ Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity ⋮ Switching costs in infinitely repeated games ⋮ Equilibria of Games in Networks for Local Tasks ⋮ Subgame perfection in recursive perfect information games ⋮ Mutual observability and the convergence of actions in a multi-person two-armed bandit model ⋮ Subgame-Perfect ϵ-Equilibria in Perfect Information Games with Common Preferences at the Limit ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfect information ⋮ Pure subgame-perfect equilibria in free transition games ⋮ Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility ⋮ Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria ⋮ Privately observed time horizons in repeated games ⋮ Markov perfect equilibrium existence for a class of undiscounted infinite-horizon dynamic games ⋮ A game-theoretic approach for the synthesis of complex systems ⋮ Coalgebraic analysis of subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite games without discounting ⋮ On Markov Equilibria in Dynamic Inventory Competition ⋮ A characterization of the perfect equilibria of infinite horizon games ⋮ Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
- Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility
- Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
- Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Equity Among Generations
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Sequential Equilibria
This page was built for publication: Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games
