Is there any theoretical justification for a nonstatement view of theories?

DOI10.1007/BF01064465zbMath0522.03002OpenAlexW2063242326MaRDI QIDQ1055753

J. Blot

Publication date: 1981

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01064465

zbMATH Keywords

reductionmodel theoryphilosophy of sciencerationalitystructuralismincommensurabilitymeta-sciencenonstatement viewtranslatability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

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Cites Work

• A set theoretic versus a model theoretic approach to the logical structure of physical theories. Some comments on J. Sneed's The logical structure of mathematical physics. With discussions by Ryszard Wojcicki, Jozef Misiek and Edmund Skarzynski
• Generalized net structures of empirical theories. I
• On the structuralist approach to the dynamics of theories
• The old and the new logic of metascience
• The problem of analyticity
• On the conservative extensions of semantical systems: A contribution to the problem of analyticity
• Two notes on abstract model theory. I. Properties invariant on the range of definable relations between structures
• ON THE LOGICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN EXPRESSIONS OF DIFFERENT THEORIES
• The logical structure of mathematical physics
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