Truthful revelation of preferences for a public good

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(83)90083-5zbMath0522.90005OpenAlexW1997835609MaRDI QIDQ1056342

Mikio Nakayama

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90083-5

zbMATH Keywords

public goodsolution conceptLindahl equilibriummaximin criteriondirect revelation mechanismoutcome functionpreference revelation mechanismtrue demand function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Implementability via protective equilibria
• On the Nonexistence of a Dominant Strategy Mechanism for Making Optimal Public Decisions
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• A Tatonement Process for Public Goods

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