A game theoretic model for two types of customers competing for service
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Publication:1056474
DOI10.1016/0167-6377(83)90019-6zbMath0523.60095OpenAlexW2071736328MaRDI QIDQ1056474
Publication date: 1983
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-6377(83)90019-6
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