Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90092-3zbMath0523.90010OpenAlexW2093046526WikidataQ56114305 ScholiaQ56114305MaRDI QIDQ1056651

Eitan Muller, Douglas H. Blair

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90092-3

zbMATH Keywords

neutralityrestricted domainsarrow social welfare functionsessential aggregation proceduresnondictatorial proceduresnonmanipulable voting procedures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Approval voting on dichotomous preferences, Stable preference aggregation with infinite population, On strategy-proof social choice under categorization, Circular domains, Social Choice Theory, Bounded response and the equivalence of nonmanipulability and independence of irrelevant alternatives, A note on nondictatorial conditions for choice mechanisms

Cites Work

• Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
• Effective nondictatorial domains
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• A Note on the General Possibility Theorem of the Social Welfare Function
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• A Characterization of Societies with Consistent Majority Decision
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
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