Social welfare functions for economic environments with and without the Pareto principle

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(83)90045-5zbMath0523.90011OpenAlexW1973024841MaRDI QIDQ1056652

Kim C. Border

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171012-170534239

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto principleindependence of irrelevant alternativesultrafilteranti-dictatordecisive coalitionsprivate goods economyweak nonimposition condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (18)

Social choice in economic environments with dimensional variation ⋮ Arrovian theorems for economic domains: Assignments, matchings and pairings ⋮ Weak independence and the Pareto principle ⋮ Social choice in economic environments ⋮ Arrovian theorems with private alternatives domains and selfish individuals ⋮ Arrow's theorem for economic environments and effective social preferences ⋮ Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel ⋮ Universally beneficial manipulation: a characterization ⋮ Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence ⋮ Arrovian theorems for economic domains. The case where there are simultaneously private and public goods ⋮ Aggregate risk and the Pareto principle ⋮ Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle ⋮ A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle ⋮ Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis ⋮ Social welfare functions on restricted economic domains ⋮ Ultraproducts and aggregation ⋮ Wilson's theorem for economic environments and continuous social preferences ⋮ Welfarism on economic domains

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The Existence of Social Welfare Functions

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