A note on the strong core of a market with indivisible goods
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Publication:1057768
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(84)90017-XzbMath0563.90013OpenAlexW2163100237MaRDI QIDQ1057768
Publication date: 1984
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(84)90017-x
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