On a theorem of Schmeidler

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(84)90029-6zbMath0563.90106OpenAlexW2083818183WikidataQ56936237 ScholiaQ56936237MaRDI QIDQ1057784

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(84)90029-6

zbMATH Keywords

noncooperative equilibrium incomplete information games continuum of agents equilibrium existence theorems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)

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