Simple majority voting isn't special

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(84)90086-6zbMath0566.90004OpenAlexW2051970113MaRDI QIDQ1059535

Jerry S. Kelly

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(84)90086-6

zbMATH Keywords

maximal alternative existenceprobability of strategyproofnessSimple majority voting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Condorcet's paradox
• Condorcet proportions and Kelly's conjectures
• Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
• Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives

This page was built for publication: Simple majority voting isn't special