Risk aversion in \(n\)-person bargaining

DOI10.1007/BF00134077zbMath0567.90102OpenAlexW2005240634MaRDI QIDQ1060138

H. J. M. Peters, S. H. Tijs

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134077

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimal \(n\)-person bargainingrisk sensitivity propertyworse alternative property

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (3)

Comparative risk aversion ⋮ The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval ⋮ Distributive justice of bargaining and risk sensitivity

Cites Work

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• Risk sensitivity in bargaining with more than two participants
• Risk sensitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity of bargaining solutions
• Characterization of all individually monotonic bargaining solutions
• The super-additive solution for the Nash bargaining game
• Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions
• The Bargaining Problem
• Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem
• Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes
• Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
• Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
• A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
• An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility

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