The law of large numbers with a continuum of i.i.d. random variables
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Publication:1060768
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90059-6zbMath0569.60037OpenAlexW1980700045MaRDI QIDQ1060768
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90059-6
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