Bargaining conventions

DOI10.1007/BF01769462zbMath0569.90105OpenAlexW4232225232MaRDI QIDQ1060976

Kenneth G. Binmore

Publication date: 1984

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769462

zbMATH Keywords

independence of irrelevant alternativesNash's bargaining problemconvention consistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (21)

The bargaining correspondence: when Edgeworth meets Nash ⋮ Matching, search, and bargaining ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule ⋮ Bargaining games with a random sequence of who makes the offers ⋮ Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games ⋮ Ståhl's bargaining model ⋮ A local independence condition for characterization of Walrasian allocations rule ⋮ Bargaining with revoking costs ⋮ Risk sharing with competition ⋮ A note on bargaining and inflation ⋮ Coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the core in three-player games ⋮ Bargaining over multiple issues with maximin and leximin preferences ⋮ Stationary perfect equilibria of an \(n\)-person noncooperative bargaining game and cooperative solution concepts ⋮ Bargaining with an agenda ⋮ The power to delay ⋮ A multilateral telephone bargaining game ⋮ A decentralized market with trading links ⋮ Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners ⋮ The Nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems ⋮ A theory of endogenous coalition structures ⋮ Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution

Cites Work

• Non-cooperative games
• Two-Person Cooperative Games
• Unnamed Item

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