Evolutionarily stable sets in mixed-strategist models

DOI10.1016/0040-5809(85)90033-4zbMath0571.92018OpenAlexW1972802654MaRDI QIDQ1061651

Bernhard Thomas

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(85)90033-4

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategyfrequency-dependent selectionasexual population of mixed-strategistsEvolutionary stable sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (11)

Evolutionary stable strategies: A review of basic theory ⋮ A maximum principle for frequency dependent selection ⋮ Game dynamics, mixed strategies, and gradient systems ⋮ Mutation-selection models in population genetics and evolutionary game theory ⋮ Asymptotic stability of strongly uninvadable sets ⋮ Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces ⋮ Cross entropy minimization in uninvadable states of complex populations ⋮ Evolutionarily stable sets in symmetric extensive two-person games ⋮ A dynamical characterization of evolutionarily stable states ⋮ Frequency- and density-dependent selection: The two-phenotype model ⋮ Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability

Cites Work

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• Evolutionary stability: States and strategies
• On evolutionarily stable sets
• Genetical ESS-models. II. Multi-strategy models and multiple alleles
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• On the local stability of an evolutionarily stable strategy in a diploid population
• Strategy stability in complex populations
• Game theory and evolution

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