Optimal employment contracts with bankruptcy constraints

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90048-1zbMath0573.90007OpenAlexW1978178223MaRDI QIDQ1062888

B. George

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90048-1

zbMATH Keywords

private informationbankruptcy constraintlabour marketoptimal incentive compatible contractunderemployment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (3)

Underemployment with liquidity-constrained multi-period firms ⋮ What is a liquidity crisis? ⋮ Default and aggregate income

Cites Work

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• A note on overemployment/underemployment in labor contracts under asymmetric information
• Maximum principle and transversality condition for concave infinite horizon economic models
• Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
• Implicit Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Bankruptcy: The Effect of Interest Rates on Layoffs
• State Constraints in Convex Control Problems of Bolza

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