Some general results on the metric rationalization for social decision rules

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90036-5zbMath0574.90003OpenAlexW2073587922MaRDI QIDQ1063515

Ehud Lerer, Shmuel Nitzan

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90036-5

zbMATH Keywords

metric rationalizationmetrizable social decision rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Social compromise and social metrics, Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties, Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules, Distance rationalization of voting rules, Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice, Does avoiding bad voting rules result in good ones?, Metric rationalization of social welfare functions, Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion', Is majority consistency possible?

Cites Work

• Some measures of closeness to unanimity and their implications
• The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment
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