Precisely dictatorial social welfare functions
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Publication:1064267
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(85)90027-8zbMath0575.90005OpenAlexW1492612253WikidataQ127016101 ScholiaQ127016101MaRDI QIDQ1064267
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(85)90027-8
Related Items (14)
1998–1999 Winter Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic ⋮ Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions ⋮ Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras ⋮ A representative individual from Arrovian aggregation of parametric individual utilities ⋮ Generic impossibility of Arrow's impossibility theorem ⋮ Arrow's theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators ⋮ Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core ⋮ Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games ⋮ Nash equilibrium and generalized integration for infinite normal form games ⋮ On continuity of Arrovian social welfare functions ⋮ Anonymity in large societies ⋮ Preference aggregation and atoms in measures ⋮ Ultraproducts and aggregation ⋮ Limiting dictatorial rules
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