Acyclic choice and group veto

DOI10.1007/BF00437313zbMath0575.90006WikidataQ57919817 ScholiaQ57919817MaRDI QIDQ1064268

B. George

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

impossibility theoremsvetoacyclic choicecollective decision procedures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Some impossibility results with domain restrictions, Voting games and acyclic collective choice rules, On \(\mathcal S\)-independence and Hansson's external independence, Vetoer and tie-making group theorems for indifference-transitive aggregation rules, Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings, Conditions on social-preference cycles, The structure of social decision functions, Utility and the individual: An analysis of internal conflicts

Cites Work

• The structure of social decision functions
• Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
• k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Social Decision Functions and the Veto
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions