Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90049-3zbMath0578.90003OpenAlexW2080909868MaRDI QIDQ1066782

Taradas Bandyopadhyay

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90049-3

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalitydictatorindependence conditionstrong dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Veto theorems with expansion consistency conditions and without the weak Pareto principle ⋮ Sequential path independence and social choice ⋮ Choice procedures and power structure in social decisions ⋮ Weakly implementable social choice rules ⋮ Rationality, path independence, and the power structure ⋮ Weak strategy proofness: The case of nonbinary social choice functions

Cites Work

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• On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice
• Symmetric social choices and collective rationality
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• Manipulation of social decision functions
• Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem
• Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
• Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
• Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
• A Direct Proof of Arrow's Theorem
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
• Rational Selection of Decision Functions

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