The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions

DOI10.1007/BF00433528zbMath0578.90004MaRDI QIDQ1066784

Jeff Strnad

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

veto playercontinuous-valuedneutral monotonic functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (14)

Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions ⋮ Structural instability of the core ⋮ The ``probability of a fit choice ⋮ Full Nash implementation of neutral social functions ⋮ The Core of Voting Games: A Partition Approach ⋮ Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model ⋮ Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences ⋮ A note on balancedness and nonemptiness of the core in voting games ⋮ Smooth social choice ⋮ General conditions for the existence of maximal elements via the uncovered set ⋮ Existence of a multicameral core ⋮ Coalitions and Catastrophic Climate Change ⋮ Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS

Cites Work

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• Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Continuous-Valued Binary Decision Procedures
• Majority Voting and Social Choice

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