Equilibrium selection in a bargaining problem with transaction costs

DOI10.1007/BF01756390zbMath0578.90101MaRDI QIDQ1066825

Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger

Publication date: 1985

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium pointstransaction costsbargainingbimatrix gamerisk dominancepayoff dominanceopportunity costsequilibrium selection theoryfinite non-cooperative gameiterative process of elimination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (1)

A parimutuel system with two horses and a continuum of bettors

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The tracing procedure: A Bayesian approach to defining a solution for n- person noncooperative games
• A solution concept for \(n\)-person noncooperative games
• The Bargaining Problem

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