Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
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Publication:1067985
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90095-XzbMath0579.90014MaRDI QIDQ1067985
John C. Fellingham, Yoon S. Suh, D. Paul Newman
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
moral hazarddomain additivitymemory contractoptimal multiperiod contractspreference separabilityrepeated agency game
Related Items (4)
Optimal principal agent contracts for a class of incentive schemes: A characterization and the rate of approach to efficiency ⋮ Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships ⋮ Optimal incentives and asymmetric distribution of information ⋮ Preference representation and randomization in principal-agent contracts
Cites Work
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- Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
- Repeated Moral Hazard
- Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
- Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
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