General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(86)90020-XzbMath0582.90005OpenAlexW2058891131MaRDI QIDQ1068674

Salvador Barberá, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(86)90020-x

zbMATH Keywords

implementing social choice functionsprotective equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Maximin, leximin, and the protective criterion: Characterizations and comparisons ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ A characterization of the maximin rule in the context of voting ⋮ Maximax, leximax, and the demanding criterion ⋮ Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules

Cites Work

• Implementability via protective equilibria
• Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Non-cooperative implementation: A survey of recent results
• Majority Voting and Social Choice

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