A note on nondictatorial conditions for choice mechanisms

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(86)90007-7zbMath0584.90008OpenAlexW2031449951MaRDI QIDQ1069836

Zvi Ritz

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(86)90007-7

zbMATH Keywords

social choicenondictatorial conditionsstrategy-proof choice mechanismsstrong nondictatorship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
• Essential aggregation procedures on restricted domains of preferences
• Characterization of the private alternatives domains admitting Arrow social welfare functions
• Effective nondictatorial domains
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Characterization of domains admitting nondictatorial social welfare functions and nonmanipulable voting procedures
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result

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