Characterization of all individually monotonic bargaining solutions
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Publication:1070955
DOI10.1007/BF01769309zbMath0584.90101OpenAlexW2116636209MaRDI QIDQ1070955
Publication date: 1985
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769309
Related Items (13)
Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: monotonic rules ⋮ On Nash's hidden assumption ⋮ On the axiomatization of the \(\tau\)-value ⋮ On the redundancy of the implicit welfarist axiom in bargaining theory ⋮ A characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution by disagreement point monotonicity ⋮ On the relevance of alternatives in bargaining: generalized average pay-off solutions ⋮ Bargaining with endogenous disagreement: the extended Kalai-Smorodinsky solution ⋮ The replacement principle in bargaining ⋮ Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions by Properties of Their Status Quo Sets ⋮ The impossibility of Paretian monotonic solutions: a strengthening of Roth's result ⋮ An asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution ⋮ The midpoint-constrained egalitarian bargaining solution ⋮ Risk aversion in \(n\)-person bargaining
Cites Work
- Continuity of bargaining solutions
- Risk sensitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity of bargaining solutions
- Replication invariance of bargaining solutions
- Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
- Arbitration of two-party disputes under ignorance
- Axiomatic models of bargaining
- The Bargaining Problem
- Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem
- A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information
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