When do market games have transferable utility?

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90041-9zbMath0585.90109OpenAlexW2100658395MaRDI QIDQ1071666

Theodore C. Bergstrom, Hal R. Varian

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/25608

zbMATH Keywords

competitive equilibriumexchange economytransferable utilitymarket gamesGorman polar formPareto efficient allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (6)

RISK REDISTRIBUTION GAMES WITH DUAL UTILITIES ⋮ Negative assortative matching of risk-averse agents with transferable expected utility ⋮ Share the gain, share the pain? Almost transferable utility, changes in production possibilities, and bargaining solutions ⋮ When is efficiency separable from distribution in the provision of club goods? ⋮ Market Games and Clubs ⋮ Multiattribute Procurement Auctions: Efficiency and Social Welfare in Theory and Practice

Cites Work

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• Note on transferable utility
• Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
• An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution
• On the Existence and Interpretation of Value Allocation
• Values for Games without Sidepayments: Some Difficulties with Current Concepts
• Excess Functions for Cooperative Games without Sidepayments

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