Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example

DOI10.1007/BF00135090zbMath0586.90006OpenAlexW2029324014WikidataQ56038371 ScholiaQ56038371MaRDI QIDQ1072419

Marji Lines

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00135090

zbMATH Keywords

collective decision-makingapproval votinghistoric reconstructionsincere single-winner election systemsingle-member constituency election systemtrichotomous preferencesVenetian dogi

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites Work

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