Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core

DOI10.1007/BF00452887zbMath0587.90105MaRDI QIDQ1072944

B. George

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

simple gamesnowhere densenessblocking coalitionsnonempty coreabsolute majority-rule gameChanges in the topologyutility space

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Individual preferences (91B08)

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The Condorcet paradox revisited ⋮ On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games ⋮ On the core of voting games ⋮ Endogenous voting agendas ⋮ Repeated Downsian electoral competition ⋮ Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates ⋮ Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model ⋮ Far-sightedness and the voting paradox ⋮ Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold ⋮ The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results ⋮ Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
• Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
• A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
• Voting Equilibria in Multidimensional Choice Spaces