On the independence from irrelevant alternatives in probabilistic choice models
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Publication:1073705
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90050-XzbMath0588.90001OpenAlexW2011165510MaRDI QIDQ1073705
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90050-x
Independence of irrelevant alternativesexpected utility theoremprobabilistic choice theorySure thing principle
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On the restrictiveness of monotonic scalable choice in probabilistic choice models ⋮ Contest success functions ⋮ Invariance of expected utilities in logit models ⋮ A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice
Cites Work
- Social utility functions for strategic decisions in probabilistic voting models
- Directional and local electoral equilibria with probabilistic voting
- Equilibrium in spatial voting: The median voter result is an artifact
- Collective Probabilistic Judgements
- Expected Plurality Voting Equilibrium and Social Choice Functions
- Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
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