Correlated equilibria in repeated games with lack of information on one side: A model with verifiable types

DOI10.1007/BF01770976zbMath0592.90107OpenAlexW1966636917MaRDI QIDQ1075959

Françoise Forges

Publication date: 1986

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01770976

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesincomplete informationcorrelated equilibriumasymmetric information patterngames withnoisy channel equilibriumuninformed player

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (6)

Time-neutrality and linearity ⋮ Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited ⋮ Additive valuations of streams of payoffs that satisfy the time value of money principle: A characterization and robust optimization ⋮ Garbling of signals and outcome equivalence ⋮ Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information ⋮ Risk-neutral equilibria of noncooperative games

Cites Work

• Correlated equilibria in a class of repeated games with incomplete information
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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