Multi-agent equilibria with market share and ranking objectives

DOI10.1007/BF00437311zbMath0593.90006MaRDI QIDQ1076595

Amoz Kats, Arthur T. Denzau, Steven M. Slutsky

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

multi-agent equilibrianonprice unidimensional spatial competitionranking objectives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (7)

Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules ⋮ Robust equilibria in location games ⋮ Mixed equilibrium in a pure location game: the case of \(n\geq 4\) firms ⋮ When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model ⋮ Equilibria on a circular market when consumers do not always buy from the closest firm ⋮ Equilibria in multi-party competition under uncertainty ⋮ Stability of equilibria in multi-party political systems

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The Principle of Minimum Differentiation Reconsidered: Some New Developments in the Theory of Spatial Competition
• Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition
• On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"

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