Allocating joint costs by means of the nucleolus

DOI10.1007/BF01770979zbMath0593.90088MaRDI QIDQ1076622

Patrick Legros

Publication date: 1986

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

nucleolus\(\tau \) -valueseparable cost remaining benefitside-payment game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (7)

On the equal surplus sharing interval solutions and an application ⋮ Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions ⋮ Cost Sharing in Production Economies ⋮ The Shapley value and average convex games ⋮ A COMPUTATIONAL APPROACH TO THE COINCIDENCE OF EGALITARIAN SOLUTIONS FOR COST-SHARING GAMES ⋮ Collinearity between the Shapley value and the egalitarian division rules for cooperative games ⋮ On the contribution of an additional player to a convex game

Cites Work

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• Common Costs, Fixed Charges, Clubs and Games
• The Cost Assignment of the Cooperative Water Resource Development: A Game Theoretical Approach
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• n-Person Games with Only 1, n - 1, and n-Person Coalitions
• An application of nonstandard analysis to game theory

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