The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
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Publication:1077313
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1zbMath0594.90002OpenAlexW1985899049WikidataQ56564680 ScholiaQ56564680MaRDI QIDQ1077313
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1
college admissions problemtrue preferencesdominant strategytwo-sided matching marketsstable matching procedure
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Cites Work
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
