Cournot and Bertrand equilibria under imperfect information

DOI10.1007/BF01229301zbMath0594.90008OpenAlexW1988156280MaRDI QIDQ1077316

Yasuhiro Sakai

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01229301

zbMATH Keywords

product differentiationimperfect informationoligopoly marketCournot and Bertrand equilibrianonsymmetric duopoly model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (8)

On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium ⋮ ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ABOUT PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION ⋮ Oligopoly, information and welfare ⋮ Robust results on the sharing of firm-specific information: incentives and welfare effects ⋮ Cournot competition and the social value of information ⋮ The impact of risk aversion on information transmission between firms ⋮ Prediction on the competitive outcome of an enterprise under the adjustment mechanism ⋮ On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games

Cites Work

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• Equilibrium prices in the Bertrand and Cournot oligopolies
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Information Sharing in Oligopoly
• A strategic market game with price and quantity strategies
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The Strategic Role of Information on the Demand Function in an Oligopolistic Market
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model

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