A Pareto optimal characterization of Rawls' social choice mechanism
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1079100
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(86)90007-8zbMath0596.90007OpenAlexW2055419990MaRDI QIDQ1079100
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(86)90007-8
Related Items (3)
Social organizations and matching theory ⋮ On the existence of fair matching algorithms ⋮ Equitable selection in bilateral matching markets
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
- An axiomatic characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension of an ordering over a set to the power set
- A note on the redundancy of an axiom in the Pattanaik-Peleg characterization of the lexicographic maximin extension
- Monotonicity, stability and egalitarianism
- Equity, efficiency and rights in social choice
- Welfare inequalities and Rawlsian axiomatics
- Leximin and utilitarian rules: A joint characterization
- Extended sympathy comparisons and the basis of social choice
- Decision making under ignorance with implications for social choice
- Rawls versus Bentham: An axiomatic examination of the pure distribution problem
- Some formal models of grading principles
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- Possibility Theorems with Interpersonally Comparable Welfare Levels
- Interpersonal Comparability and Social Choice Theory
- Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems
- Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution
- Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle
- Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice
- On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis
- A Theorem on Utilitarianism
- On Interpersonal Comparability and Social Welfare Orderings
- Equity in Two Person Situations: Some Consequences
This page was built for publication: A Pareto optimal characterization of Rawls' social choice mechanism
