Some remarks on the stable matching problem
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Publication:1079121
DOI10.1016/0166-218X(85)90074-5zbMath0596.90054OpenAlexW2048888597MaRDI QIDQ1079121
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218x(85)90074-5
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