Sequential elections with limited information. A formal analysis

DOI10.1007/BF00433535zbMath0597.90008OpenAlexW1491571773MaRDI QIDQ1079459

Peter C. Ordeshook, Richard D. McKelvey

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00433535

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete information modelone-dimensional policy spacesequence of electionsstationary rational expectations equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items

Sequential elections with limited information. A formal analysis, Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources, Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework, On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness, Partisan politics and election failure with ignorant voters, Political engineering: optimizing a U.S. Presidential candidate's platform

Cites Work

• Sequential elections with limited information. A formal analysis
• Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
• Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information