On continuous reaction function equilibria in duopoly supergames with mean payoffs

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90027-XzbMath0598.90102OpenAlexW2034189591MaRDI QIDQ1080372

William G. Stanford

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90027-x

zbMATH Keywords

supergamesperfect equilibriumContinuous reaction function equilibriastationary outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items

Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions ⋮ Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices

Cites Work

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• Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial
• On the abundance of aperiodic behaviour for maps on the interval
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Simple mathematical models with very complicated dynamics
• Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly