Strategic behaviour and a notion of ex ante efficiency in a voting model

DOI10.1007/BF00433523zbMath0601.90008MaRDI QIDQ1081505

David Schmeidler, Andrew Postlewaite

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strategic behaviourstochastic dominanceex ante efficiencystraightforwardnessvoting modellottery-over-outcomesprofiles of ordinal preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness ⋮ An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes ⋮ Portioning using ordinal preferences: fairness and efficiency ⋮ Implementation in dynamic job transfers ⋮ Truthful revelation in the Diamond and Dybvig banking environment

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Straightforwardness of Game Forms with Lotteries as Outcomes
• Unnamed Item

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