On enforcing socially best alternatives of binary group decision rules

DOI10.1007/BF00649264zbMath0601.90012OpenAlexW2011311046MaRDI QIDQ1081509

K. Pattanaik, Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00649264

zbMATH Keywords

corestrong equilibriumsequential eliminationgroup decision rulesvoting by successive amendments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Multi-stage voting, sequential elimination and Condorcet consistency

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Stability in Voting
• Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes
• Consistent Voting Systems
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems

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