A further note on the stable matching problem
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Publication:1082352
DOI10.1016/0166-218X(87)90059-XzbMath0603.05033OpenAlexW1992705916MaRDI QIDQ1082352
Marilda Sotomayor, Gabrielle Demange, David Gale
Publication date: 1987
Published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-218x(87)90059-x
Edge subsets with special properties (factorization, matching, partitioning, covering and packing, etc.) (05C70) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)
Related Items (16)
Two-sided matching markets with strongly correlated preferences ⋮ Vacancy chains and equilibration in senior-level labor markets ⋮ Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems ⋮ The blocking lemma for a many-to-one matching model ⋮ Maximal manipulation of envy-free solutions in economies with indivisible goods and money ⋮ Unique stable matchings ⋮ On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory ⋮ Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor ⋮ Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Welfare and stability in senior matching markets ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions ⋮ Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof ⋮ Marriage matching and gender satisfaction ⋮ Strategic Issues in One-to-One Matching with Externalities
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