Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
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Publication:1083004
DOI10.1007/BF00435661zbMath0603.90012MaRDI QIDQ1083004
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
voting rulesmanipulationsmooth manifoldexistence of a corenon-existence of cyclessocial preference functionstrict acyclic preferences
Related Items (4)
Structural instability of the core ⋮ On the core of voting games ⋮ Smooth social choice ⋮ The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
Cites Work
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- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
- Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
- The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
- Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
- Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
- Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions
- Consistent Voting Systems
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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