Rationing, bargaining, and voting in 2-sided markets

DOI10.1007/BF00433766zbMath0603.90027MaRDI QIDQ1083011

R. J. Gardner

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

majority rulebargainingWalrasian equilibrium\(\lambda \)-transfer valuedisequilibrium price dynamicstemporary equilibrium of 2-sided markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• On the efficiency of fixed price equilibrium
• Axiomatic models of bargaining
• Equilibrium with quantity rationing and recontracting
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The Bargaining Problem
• The Fixed Price Equilibria: Some Results in Local Comparative Statics
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Temporary General Equilibrium Theory
• On the Dynamics of Disequilibrium: A Simple Remark

This page was built for publication: Rationing, bargaining, and voting in 2-sided markets