Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90048-7zbMath0603.90028OpenAlexW2046934461MaRDI QIDQ1083012

James S. Jordan

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://purl.umn.edu/1798

zbMATH Keywords

local stabilityWalrasian allocationscontinuous- time strategy adjustment processCournot (Nash) equilibrium outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (4)

Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms ⋮ Generalized Groves-Ledyard mechanisms ⋮ Communication complexity and stability of equilibria in economies and games ⋮ Adaptive dynamics and the implementation problem with complete information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
• A simple auctioneerless mechanism with Walrasian properties
• Locally stable price mechanisms
• On allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
• A convergent process of price adjustment and global Newton methods
• On the equilibrium price set of an exchange economy
• On the homotopy groups of spheres and rotation groups
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• Some Examples of Global Instability of the Competitive Equilibrium
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• Effective Price Mechanisms
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• On the Nature of the Spectrum of Singular Second Order Linear Differential Equations

This page was built for publication: Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations