Private information in large economies

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90019-0zbMath0604.90033OpenAlexW1996484786MaRDI QIDQ1083358

Sanjay Srivastava, Thomas R. Palfrey

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90019-0

zbMATH Keywords

resource allocationprivate informationlarge economiesinformational economicsstochastic information structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60)

Related Items

Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives, Equilibrium concepts in differential information economies, Equilibria and incentives in private information economies, Closure under interim utility equivalence implies two-agent Bayesian implementation, Existence of equilibrium in Bayesian games with infinitely many players, Approximately competitive equilibria in large finite economies, Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents, Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies, Strategic knowledge sharing in Bayesian games, Implementation of Walrasian expectations equilibria

Cites Work

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