Social compromise and social metrics

DOI10.1007/BF00433520zbMath0605.90013MaRDI QIDQ1083992

Shmuel Nitzan, Donald E. Campbell

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

constitutional designsocial metricsummary axiom

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items (7)

Monotonicity-based consensus states for the monometric rationalisation of ranking rules and how they are affected by ties ⋮ Distance rationalization of anonymous and homogeneous voting rules ⋮ Distance rationalization of voting rules ⋮ Level \(r\) consensus and stable social choice ⋮ Metric rationalization of social welfare functions ⋮ Approximating optimal social choice under metric preferences ⋮ Demystifying the `metric approach to social compromise with the unanimity criterion'

Cites Work

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• Preference Structures. II: Distances Between Asymmetric Relations
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• The Borda Rule and Pareto Stability: A Comment

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