On strong representations of games by social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(86)90022-4zbMath0604.90141OpenAlexW2025496675MaRDI QIDQ1084029

Ron Holzman

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(86)90022-4

zbMATH Keywords

allocation of decision powerGames in characteristic functionstrong representation of simple games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (11)

Choosing \(k\) from \(m\): feasible elimination procedures reconsidered ⋮ The capacity of a committee ⋮ Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatible representations of committees ⋮ Consistent voting systems with a continuum of voters ⋮ On the continuity of representations of effectivity functions ⋮ Vetoing in social choice with blockings ⋮ Representations of political power structures by strategically stable game forms: a survey ⋮ Self-implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Strong Equilibrium ⋮ Book review of: Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters, Strategic social choice. Stable representations of constitutions ⋮ On strongly consistent social choice functions ⋮ Stable voting procedures for committees in economic environments

Cites Work

• The capacity of a committee
• Representation of characteristic function games by social choice functions
• The structure of exactly strongly consistent social choice functions
• Representations of simple games by social choice functions
• The Proportional Veto Principle
• Consistent Voting Systems
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