Comparison of theories for payoff disbursement of coalition values

DOI10.1007/BF00125655zbMath0604.90143OpenAlexW2472349455MaRDI QIDQ1084030

Amnon Rapoport

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00125655

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationprediction setcharacteristic function gamescompetitively testing coalition modelsexperimental n-person games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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• On the predictive efficiency of the core solution in side-payment games
• Coalition formation in the triad when two are weak and one is strong
• When you don't need to join: The effects of guaranteed payoffs on bargaining in three-person cooperative games
• The competitive bargaining set for cooperative \(n\)-person games
• The power of a coalition and payoff disbursement in three‐person negotiable conflicts
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game

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