Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(86)90026-8zbMath0604.90144OpenAlexW1969747271MaRDI QIDQ1084031

William G. Stanford

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90026-8

zbMATH Keywords

discountingsubgame perfectinfinitely repeated duopoly gamesnontrivial reaction function equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (7)

On continuous reaction function equilibria in duopoly supergames with mean payoffs ⋮ Existence and local stability of Pareto superior reaction function equilibria in discounted supergames ⋮ Non-trivial subgame perfect duopoly equilibria can be supported by continuous reaction functions ⋮ Over- and under-investment according to different benchmarks ⋮ The strength of a little perfection ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibrium with continuous reaction functions ⋮ Reactive strategies: an inch of memory, a mile of equilibria

Cites Work

• Equilibrium in supergames with the overtaking criterion
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly
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